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Abstract
In inspection programs, policies of disclosing inspection performance promote greater
compliance via general deterrence—i.e., by increasing the expected cost of regula-
tory violations. Yet, despite their growing popularity as regulatory aids, an un-
examined matter is how specific deterrence—deterrence that follows from receiving
punishment—might influence the effectiveness of disclosure policies. In Las Vegas,
Nevada, food-service health inspections are scored numerically. Using a simple grading
scale, scores are then coarsened into letter grades which restaurants must prominently
display. There is, however, a wrinkle to this grading scale: establishments committing
the same violation in consecutive inspections are downgraded one letter. By virtue of
this downgrade rule, punishment assignment varies among identically scored inspec-
tions. Relative to establishments with identical sequences of prior inspection scores, I
find that restaurants are assessed 17-27% fewer demerits following a downgrade. This
substantial specific deterrence effect has important implications for the design of dis-
closure policies; particularly, regarding the coarsening of numeric scores into letter
grades.
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1 Introduction
Disclosure of regulatory violations is an increasingly popular supplement to conventional
inspection programs. In general, disclosure is a relatively inexpensive regulatory tool, and
has been found to improve restaurant hygiene (Jin and Leslie, 2003), drinking-water quality
(Bennear and Olmstead, 2008), firm environmental ratings (Chatterji and Toffel, 2010), and
worker safety (Johnson, 2020). Yet, by raising the stakes, disclosure can distort incentives
toward manipulation or “gaming” behavior by producers (Dranove et al., 2003; Jacob and
Levitt, 2003; Figlio and Getzler, 2006; Forbes et al., 2015), which underscores the importance
of carefully designing disclosure policies.
When added to existing sanctions for noncompliance, disclosure of inspection performance
enhances the punishment firms incur for detected regulatory violations. These enhancements
promote compliance through general deterrence; that is, by increasing the expected cost of
regulatory violations. However, despite their potential and popularity, an unexamined mat-
ter is how specific deterrence—deterrence that follows from actually being punished—might
influence the effectiveness of disclosure policies as regulatory aids.
Recently, mandatory disclosure supplementing inspection programs has been especially
common in food-service regulation.1 Food-service health inspections are often numerically
scored, with detected health code violations carrying prescribed point deductions (from some
base value) or demerits. Some public health agencies then disclose these scores. Others how-
ever, disclose only letter grades, which pool all scores within broad intervals. A subtle
drawback of this coarsening is that potential specific deterrence goes unrealized, because
detected violations only carry punishments if they push scores out of the top letter-grade
interval. The significance of this drawback depends on if, and to what extent, specific deter-
rence exists in this setting. Yet, in general, estimating a counterfactual for those punished
1At https://www.foodsafetynews.com/restaurant-inspections-in-your-area/, Food Safety News
maintains links to food-service inspection data which are made available by 236 different agencies spanning
all 50 US states and the District of Columbia.
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complicates assessment of specific deterrence at the extensive margin.2 Exploiting a grading
rule from a food-service-hygiene disclosure policy, I overcome this challenge, and find evi-
dence of substantial specific deterrence.
The Southern Nevada Health District (SNHD) conducts food-service health inspections
in the Las Vegas metropolitan area, and implements a disclosure policy. Inspections are
scored numerically, with each detected violation carrying a prescribed demerit amount. Nu-
meric scores are then coarsened to letter grades using a simple scale,3 and establishments
are issued letter-grade placards which they must display until their next inspection. There
is, however, a wrinkle to the basic grading scale: establishments that commit an identical
violation across consecutive inspections are downgraded one letter. Consequently, following
identically scored inspections (in the top letter-grade interval); some establishments incur
punishment, while others do not.
Using SNHD inspections spanning January 2014 to March 2020; I estimate the effect
of specific deterrence by exploiting this downgrade rule, which varies punishment among
establishments that can be matched on recent detected compliance patterns. Holding exact
sequences of (up to four) prior inspection scores fixed, I find evidence of significant and sub-
stantial specific deterrence at the extensive margin. Relative to comparable establishments
that were not downgraded, establishments are assessed 17-27.1% fewer demerits in inspec-
tions that follow a downgrade.
These findings further our understanding of a disclosure-policy design that is common
in food-service regulation (where disclosure policies are widespread).4 When designing dis-
closure policies to supplement inspection programs, my results suggest specific deterrence as
a significant channel for promoting compliance. Yet, coarsening numeric scores into letter
grades misses out on much of this, because so many detected violations ultimately incur no
2At the extensive margin, specific deterrence is the effect of punishment relative to going unpunished.
3Scores of: 10 demerits or fewer receive an A grade; 11 to 20 demerits receive a B grade; 21 to 40 demerits
receive a C grade; and 41 or more demerits receive an X grade and are temporarily closed.
4For instance, as of July 2020, 18 public health agencies share restaurant inspection information with
Yelp.com. Of those agencies, 10 coarsen numeric scores prior to disclosure (6 report letter grades, and 4
simply report pass or fail.)
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punishment. Over this period, roughly 81% of SNHD inspections with violations still yielded
the top letter grade (went unpunished). This particular drawback of letter-grade coarsening,
while perhaps subtler than others,5 appears substantial.
2 Background
The SNHD was established jointly by Clark County, and the cities of Boulder City, Hen-
derson, Las Vegas, Mesquite, and North Las Vegas, as the public health authority within
those entities. Since 2005, a basic structure of scoring, grading, and disclosure has been in
place; but scoring and grading criteria have changed several times. My analyses focus on
the current policy regime, which began January 1, 2014. Since then, the regulations, scoring
rules, and grading scheme have not changed.
Under the current regime, there are four categories of violation. The most serious, im-
minent health hazards, incur immediate temporary closure and fines. The SNHD defines the
second most serious, critical violations, as “items directly related to the protection of the
public from foodborne illness or injury”. Major violations are items that “if left un-addressed
may lead to a situation detrimental to public health”. Least severe are violations of good food
management practices (or good-practices violations). Critical, major, and good-practices vi-
olations, carry 5, 3, and 0 demerits, respectively. Imminent health hazards trigger an X
grade (the lowest possible).
On placards, inspection scores are coarsened into letter grades, which establishments
must conspicuously display until their next inspection. Scores of: 10 demerits or fewer re-
ceive an A grade; 11 to 20 demerits receive a B grade; 21 to 40 demerits receive a C grade.
Establishments assessed 41 demerits or more are temporarily closed, fined, and given an X
grade. Most importantly (for this paper) is the downgrade rule: establishments committing
5Another drawback is that these systems distort incentives near letter-grade thresholds, which can ul-
timately compromise the integrity of inspections (see Makofske, 2020). Also, the further coarsening of an
already one-dimensional metric (the numeric inspection score) limits the informational content of the dis-
closed signal, but does little to further simplify it.
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an identical critical or major violation in consecutive inspections are downgraded one letter.
3 Data
Data are from the Southern Nevada Health District (2020) website.6 Observations corre-
spond to inspections and report (among other things): date, establishment, total assessed
demerits, and letter grade. As seen in Appendix Table A1, the SNHD inspects many different
establishment types, including some that are obscure. To focus on more common establish-
ment types, primary estimates use only: bars/taverns, buffets, food trucks/mobile vendors,
restaurants, and snack bars. The estimating sample spans January 1, 2014 to March 9, 2020.
It consists only of routine inspections where the establishment’s previous inspection involved
at least one major or critical violation, and yielded 11 demerits or fewer.7
4 Estimation Strategy
I test for specific deterrence utilizing the downgrade rule, which varies the administration
of punishment across identically scored inspections. Figure 1 demonstrates that, holding
previous inspection score fixed, establishments perform better following downgrades. To
control for other characteristics, I estimate a baseline linear model,
Demi,j = αDowngradei,j−1 +
∑
k∈K
βk × I (Demi,j−1 = k) +X
′
i,jω + ǫi,j, (1)
where Demi,j denotes total demerits assessed in the j
th routine inspection of establishment i.
Downgradei,j−1 is a binary variable indicating that establishment i was downgraded in their
previous inspection due to a consecutive identical critical or major violation. The estimating
sample is restricted to observations where the demerit total from the establishment’s previ-
6See https://www.southernnevadahealthdistrict.org/permits-and-regulations/restaurant-
inspections/developers/.
7These are the inspections where the downgrade rule may affect whether or not a punishment is incurred.
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ous routine inspection belongs to K = {3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10}.8 Table 1 summarizes this sample.
The vector of controls, Xi,j, contains fixed effects for an inspection’s weekday, month,
year, and days elapsed (in 60-day intervals) since the establishment’s previous inspection.
Also included are fixed effects for the year—beginning with 2005—of the establishment’s
first recorded inspection to account for differences in age/experience.
In estimating equation (1), αˆ compares detected compliance among establishments whose
previous inspections yielded identical scores, but very different grades. In case the specific
deterrence effect is partly persistent, I remove establishments from the estimating sample
after one post-downgrade inspection.9 To identify specific deterrence, the underlying as-
sumption is that: absent the downgrade rule and holding all controls fixed, expected Demi,j
would be the same for establishments that did, and did not, commit consecutive identical
major or critical violations in inspection j − 1.
Under the baseline specification, a threat to identification arises if Downgradei,j−1 differs
conditional on compliance patterns prior to inspection j − 1. Two particular differences
would be problematic. First, if downgrades are more likely amid downward trends in demer-
its, then the continuation of these trends could be mistaken for specific deterrence. The other
problematic issue would be if downgrades are more likely in worse-than-usual performances
by establishments. Then, following the aberration, a return to their normal compliance levels
might also be mistaken as specific deterrence.
To address these concerns, I augment the baseline specification and match establishments
8With good-practices violations assessed 0 demerits, inspection totals of 4 and 7 demerits are not possible.
Prior to 2014, good-practices violations incurred 1 demerit. In observations where Demi,j−1 is from an
inspection prior to 2014, the demerit total is adjusted to what it would have been under the current scoring
system.
9This ensures that scores from inspections where Downgradei,j−1 = 1, are only compared to scores from
establishments that had never been downgraded as of their (j − 1)th inspection.
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on more than their most recent prior inspection score. First, I estimate
Demi,j = αDowngradei,j−1 +
∑
(l,m)∈L
β(l,m) × I (Demi,j−2 = l,Demi,j−1 = m)
+X
′
i,jω + ǫi,j,
(2)
where I is a binary indicator, and L is a set of 50 sequences, (Demi,j−2 = l,Demi,j−1 =
m), over which variation in Downgradei,j−1 is observed. That is, equation (2) estimates
the immediate effect of having been downgraded, holding the sequence of Demi,j−2 and
Demi,j−1 fixed. In separate specifications, establishments are matched on 206 sequences,
(Demi,j−3,Demi,j−2,Demi,j−1); and then on 297 sequences, (Demi,j−4, Demi,j−3, Demi,j−2,
Demi,j−1).
5 Results
Column (1) of Table 2 reports estimates of equation (1) under a simple specification in
which indicators of Demi,j−1 are the only included controls. In column (2), fixed effects are
included for an inspection’s weekday, month, year, and days elapsed (in 60-day intervals)
since an establishment’s previous routine inspection. In column (3), fixed effects for the year
of an establishment’s first recorded inspection are added. Standard errors are clustered by
establishment, and reported in parentheses.
Across all three specifications, estimates demonstrate significant and substantial specific
deterrence. Among the estimating sample’s inspections where Downgradei,j−1 = 0, estab-
lishments are assessed 6.5527 demerits on average. The specific deterrence effect estimated
in the full specification, represents a 26.30% reduction in demerits relative to that average.
Columns (1), (2), and (3) of Table 3, report estimates that hold the sequence of an es-
tablishment’s two, three, and four most recent inspection scores fixed, respectively. Across
all three specifications, downgraded establishments are assessed significantly and substan-
tially fewer demerits than establishments that were not downgraded, but followed the same
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inspection-score sequence up to that point. The coefficients in columns (1), (2), and (3),
represent 27.10%, 23.21%, and 17.02% reductions relative to means from their respective
estimating samples when Downgradei,j−1 = 0. The significant and substantial effect re-
ported in column (3)—where the exact scoring sequence from four prior inspections is held
fixed—largely alleviates concerns about Downgradei,j−1 correlating with prior compliance
patterns.10
6 Concluding Remarks
These results have important implications regarding the design of disclosure policies to sup-
plement inspection programs. As seen, specific deterrence can be a significant channel for
promoting compliance. Numeric-score disclosure would likely make better use of this chan-
nel, because it punishes every detected violation. And while the punishments of posting 3 to
10-demerit scores are less severe than posting a B, about 81% of the routine inspections with
violations over this period resulted in A grades. As such, disclosing numeric scores in the
A-grade range could have a substantial aggregate effect even by generating inspection-level
specific deterrence that is a small fraction of the effect estimated here.
10Using all establishment types, Appendix Tables A2 and A3 report estimates corresponding to Tables 2
and 3. Estimates are very similar in sign, significance and magnitude.
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Figure 1: Specific Deterrence Following Downgrades
Average demerits in current inspections, by demerits and downgrade status from establishments’
most recent previous inspections. Navy triangles mark averages among establishments that were
not downgraded in their previous inspection, and red circles mark averages among establishments
that were. Averages are from the 43,160 inspections in the primary estimating sample.
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Table 1: Estimating Sample Summary
Demi,j−1 Downgradei,j−1 = 0 Downgradei,j−1 = 1
3 14,377 111
5 2,641 12
6 9,158 203
8 9,066 108
9 6,384 219
10 868 13
Observations from the 43,160 inspections in the primary estimating sample. In total, 666 inspections
(about 1.54%) resulted in downgrades.
Table 2: Specific Deterrence: Baseline Estimates
Demi,j
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Downgradei,j−1 -1.4800*** -1.7839*** -1.7283***
(0.2158) (0.2169) (0.2170)
Dem i,j−1 FE Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE N Y Y
Month-of-Year FE N Y Y
Year FE N Y Y
Days Elapsed FE† N Y Y
Age FE‡ N N Y
R-squared 0.0516 0.0661 0.0692
N 43,160 43,160 43,160
***p < 0.01
OLS estimates of equation (1). The dependent variable is total demerits assessed in jth inspection
of establishment i. The explanatory variable of interest indicates whether establishment i was
downgraded due to a consecutive identical major or critical violation in its (j − 1)th inspection.
Standard errors, clustered by establishment, are reported in parentheses.
†These fixed effects indicate whether the days elapsed since an establishment’s previous inspection
are: 0-60, 61-120, 121-180, 181-240, 241-300, 301-360, 361-420, 421-480, 481-540, or more than 540.
‡These fixed effects control for the first year in the raw data (going back to 2005) that an estab-
lishment was inspected. Establishments first inspected in 2017 or later are grouped together.
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Table 3: Specific Deterrence Estimates: Matching on Recent Inspection Se-
quences
Demi,j
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Downgradei,j−1 -1.7111*** -1.4272*** -0.9335***
(0.2173) (0.2247) (0.2759)
Sequence Fixed Effects
(Demi,j−1,Demi,j−2) Y N N
(Demi,j−1,Demi,j−2,Demi,j−3) N Y N
(Demi,j−1,Demi,j−2,Demi,j−3,Demi,j−4) N N Y
Day-of-Week FE Y Y Y
Month-of-Year FE Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Days Elapsed FE Y Y Y
Age FE Y Y Y
R-squared 0.1035 0.1107 0.1533
N 33,888 18,967 6,880
***p < 0.01
OLS estimates. Sequence fixed effects account for the establishment’s exact sequence of prior scores.
Standard errors, clustered by establishment, are reported in parentheses.
A1 Appendix
Table A1: Establishment Types in Raw Data
Establishment Type Number of Establishments
Bakery Sales 101
Banquet Kitchen 98
Banquet Support 38
Bar/Tavern 4,613
Barbeque 142
Beer Bar 14
Buffet 468
Caterer 424
Childcare Kitchens 54
Concessions 82
Confection 55
Elementary School Kitchen 264
Farmer’s Market 54
Food Trucks/Mobile Vendor 995
Frozen Meat Sales 35
Garde Manger 90
Grocery Store Sampling 91
Institutional Food Service 142
Kitchen Bakery 103
Main Kitchen 13
Meat/Poultry/Seafood 219
Pantry 460
Portable Bar 85
Portable Unit 1,239
Produce Market 106
Restaurant 8,624
Self-Service Food Truck 66
Snack Bar 2,474
Special Kitchen 2,214
Vegetable Prep 53
Since 2005, the number of establishments in each of the SNHD classifications.
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Table A2: Baseline Estimates: All Establishment Types
Demi,j
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Downgradei,j−1 -1.3463*** -1.5785*** -1.5347***
(0.1833) (0.1837) (0.1838)
Dem i,j−1 FE Y Y Y
Day-of-Week FE N Y Y
Month-of-Year FE N Y Y
Year FE N Y Y
Days Elapsed FE N Y Y
Age FE N N Y
R-squared 0.0544 0.0674 0.0699
N 54,689 54,689 54,689
***p < 0.01
OLS estimates of equation (1) with the sample including all establishment types. Standard errors,
clustered by establishment, are reported in parentheses.
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Table A3: Matching on Recent Inspection Sequences: All Establishment
Types
Demi,j
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Downgradei,j−1 -1.6305*** -1.3938*** -0.9696***
(0.1845) (0.1914) (0.2370)
Sequence Fixed Effects
(Demi,j−1,Demi,j−2) Y N N
(Demi,j−1,Demi,j−2,Demi,j−3) N Y N
(Demi,j−1,Demi,j−2,Demi,j−3,Demi,j−4) N N Y
Day-of-Week FE Y Y Y
Month-of-Year FE Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Days Elapsed FE Y Y Y
Age FE Y Y Y
R-squared 0.1112 0.1294 0.1513
N 44,220 26,110 9,262
***p < 0.01
OLS estimates from all establishment types. The sequence fixed effects account for the estab-
lishment’s exact sequence of scores. Standard errors, clustered by restaurant, are reported in
parentheses.
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